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I. LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The parties to this appeal are the petitioner, Beehive Telephone Company, the
respondent, Utah Public Service Commission, and possibly the enforcement arm of
the Commission, the Utah Division of Public Utilities.
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IV. JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
I "1 lis Court has jurisdiction over these consolidated appeals pursuant to I Jtal i.
Code Annotated, section / 8 2 2(3)(e)(i)

enforced, by the Utah Public Service Commission (the "Commission o* i * >•. "I JPSC")
against Beehive Telephone Company ("Beehive").
On April 10, 1,997, the Commission fined Beehive $182,500. The following
issues are presented by the imposition of this fine.
a \* rl lethei tl le fine was imposed in violation of due process of law?
I: ' i hetl lei the violations that were predicates to imposing

»r tiu- ;u.o were

j: i :: > ed, c :>f isistel it • itl I tl lei i lies :: f tl le Conn '
1:5otl i of tl iese issi les, n I Beel irv e's \ ie \ \
by ' this Coi n t i 10 deference shoi lid tx1 jn1
Commission. Seef e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service
Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (I Jtal i 1981).
On November 3,1999, the Commission enforced the fine of $ 182,500 entered
earlier on Api ill 10. 199 / I he following issues are presented by the enforcement of
tl lis fii ie
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a. Whether, in the event the April 10,1997, order imposing the fine is reversed,
the November 3, 1999, order enforcing the fine also should fall;
b. Whether the enforcement action leading to the November 3,1999, order was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations;
c. Whether the Commission had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the
enforcement action leading to the November 3, 1999, order;
d. Whether the enforcement action leading to the November 3,1999, order was
in the nature of a criminal contempt proceeding, entitling Beehive to constitutional
protections such as trial by jury; and
e. Whether contempt was proved respecting the April 10, 1997, order as
justification for enforcement of the fines in the November 3, 1999, order.
All of these issues, in Beehive's view, pose questions of law, and on review by
this Court no deference should be given to the analysis or ruling of the Commission.
See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public Service Commission, 636
P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981).
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, AND RULES
Beehive has reproduced in an addendum to this brief all those constitutional
provisions, statutes, and rules that may be determinative of the outcome of these
6

consolidated appeals. These provisions, statutes, and rules include the following.
I nited States Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause
I Jtal 1 Constitutioi 1, Due Process Clause

i Ill if CI I: iptei 1\ A I i! li 5 54 i )f1 1 le I Jl \ tl IC < - I- i

' •

Utah Public Service Commission Rule R746-100-10 I;. 1.
VII. NATURE OF THE CASE
WITH RELEVANT FACTS AND
CITATIONS TO THE RECORD
Beehive is a small telephone company. It serves remote areas of rural Utah

A4

the time of the proceedings that led to tl lese consoliaateu appeals, Beehrv e haa ouu
iisloiiu'ifi yvt/ir sci

Thesr r

nsolidatc *

orders of the Commission,

IIJCS

siitiiuiU ill in 1

> r ; ^ . technically from three but essentially <r " * i
ilicsc orders imposed and then enforced fines upon

Beehive for violating quality of service standards and tariff rules. The fine amounts
originally were enormous, but since have been reduced. Even as reduced, however,
they are grossly disproportionate to .|.r \ HMatiun> involved. More important, the
manner and process by x\ 1 lie! i the fines were assessed and ei lforced reflect an abuse oi
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administrative power that must be reversed by this Court.
The first order was entered by the Commission on April 10th, 1997 (hereinafter
called the "April 10th Order"). This order, without prior notice, imposed penalties in
the amount of $ 182,500 against Beehive. The penalties were imposed on account of
violations that never were proved and, in any event, were not willful. The second
order was entered by the Commission on November 3rd, 1999 (hereinafter called the
"November 3rd Order"). This order purported to enforce the previously imposed
$182,500 fine against Beehive. It likewise was unlawful and unwarranted for a
variety of reasons. Probably recognizing the flaws in its procedures and rulings, by
subsequent order dated February 5,2002, the Commission reduced the $182,500 fine
to a $15,000 fine. Beehive believes that this reduction in amount does not cure the
deficiencies outlined below. Since the analysis for both the November 3rd Order and
the February 5,2002, order is the same, for convenience hereafter, both orders will be
referenced as the November 3rd Order.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Beehive will narrate the factual and procedural background to the orders at
issue in the case in two stages. The first stage involves entry of the April 10th Order
originally imposing the $182,500 fine. The second stage describes circumstances
leading to the November 3rd Order enforcing the $182,500 fine.
8

1. Imposition of the $182,500 Fine
On July 8, 1996, the Utah Division of Public Utilities ("Division" or "DPU"),
filed a petition for an order to show cause against Beehive. The Division's petition is
reproduced at Petitioner's Appendix, pages 1-18 (hereinafter cited as "Appendix" with
page numbers). The petition, in part, was a response to complaints from customers of
Beehive in the Rush Valley, Terra, and Vemon service areas. The petition also was
prompted by a complaint from the Commission itself, presumably pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, section 54-4a-l(l)(c).l
The petition averred that (1) Beehive's quality of service was inadequate
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, section 54-3-1, (2) Beehive was committing billing
errors, failing to comply with Commission Rule R746-240-4, and (3) Beehive was
charging subscribers improperly for certain landline calls to cellular phones, which
allegedly was contrary to the terms of the applicable Beehive tariff.
Respecting the quality of service issue, Beehive was not accused of violating
l Section 54-4a-l(l)(c) empowers the Division to "investigate or study, upon
complaint, upon order of the Public Service Commission, or upon its own initiative,
any matter within the jurisdiction of the [public service] commission." (Emphasis
supplied.) The Division's petition for an order to show cause notes that, "On March
18,1996 the Division received a Commission utility complaint request to investigate
subscriber complaints [against Beehive]." Appendix, page 2. Thus, the Commission
invoked its executive power of utility investigation to direct the Division to proceed
against Beehive.
9

any specific service standard, only the general provisions of section 54-3-1.2
Respecting the tariff issue, the Division's concerns were prompted by a
complaint from a Beehive subscriber in Vernon, Mr. Kent Sagers. Appendix, page 6.
Mr. Sagers claimed that he was charged toll or long distance rates for placing calls to
Toole within a so-called "Extended Area Service11 zone where local rates should
apply. Appendix, page 6. The calls were placed from a landline or wireline phone to
a cell or wireless phone. This was said to violate Beehive's tariff. Appendix, page
10. The form of complaint prepared by Division staff, however, confirmed that toll
charges sometimes may be assessed when local exchange circuits are used to capacity

2 Section 54-3-1 provides that: "All charges made, demanded or received by any
public utility, or by any two or more public utilities, for any product or commodity
furnished or to be furnished, or for any service rendered or to be rendered, shall be
just and reasonable. Every unjust or unreasonable charge made, demanded or
received for such product or commodity or service is hereby prohibited and declared
unlawful. Every public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service,
instrumentalities, equipment andfacilities as will promote the safety, health, comfort
and convenience of its patrons, employees and the public, and as will be in all
respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable. All rules and regulations made by a
public utility affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the public shall be just
and reasonable. The scope of definition fjust and reasonable* may include, but shall
not be limited to, the cost of providing service to each category of customer,
economic impact of charges on each category of customer, and on the well-being of
the state of Utah; methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such
products, commodities or services, and means of encouraging conservation of
resources and energy." (Emphasis supplied.) The underlined portion of this statutory
mandate contains the language relied upon by the Division in the petition for an order
10

- in so-called "overflow" circumstances: "Toll charges between Vernon and Tooele
would only apply only [sic] on an overflow basis and only when the customer dials 1 801- etc." Appendix, page 6. In subsequent testimony, Division staff ratified this
interpretation of the Beehive tariff. Appendix, page 237 (testimony of Krystal
Fishlock, Division auditor). And the tariff does contain language justifying this
interpretation: "During heavy EAS calling times, circuits may not be available.
Customers may use [long distance] circuits ..." Appendix, page 10. The Division
complaint also notes that there were no allegations of overcharges until March of
1996:

"This is the first month these calls have been toll rated by Beehive."

Appendix, page 6.
For relief or remedy, the Division's petition prayed the Commission to order
Beehive (1) to "rectify the above referenced service problems," Appendix, page 2, (2)
to "explain" the reasons for the putative irregularities in billing practice, Appendix,
page 3, and (3) to "cease and desist" the practice of assessing toll charges for certain
cellular calls, Appendix, page 3. The Division's petition did not aver that Beehive's
conduct was tantamount to willful disobedience to any Commission mandate. Nor
did the petition seek the imposition of fines, penalties, or sanctions against Beehive.
On July 23, 1996, the UPSC granted the petition that it had invited from the

to show cause. Appendix, page 2.
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Division and issued an order to show cause. This order is reproduced at Appendix,
pages 19-33. The order essentially parrots the Division's petition, and directs Beehive
to appear before the Commission's administrative law judge for the purpose of
"formal investigation and adjudication." Appendix, page 23. The order nowhere
suggests that Beehive's conduct is in any way contumacious. Indeed, the order notes
that, by letter dated July 12, 1996, Beehive desires to have the air cleared through a
hearing. Appendix, page 23. The order nowhere states that willful disobedience to
Commission regulations, fines, penalties, or sanctions are to be issues in the case.
On August 16, 1996, the administrative law judge, A. Robert Thurman
("ALJ"), issued an order that directed the Division and Beehive to appear at a prehearing conference. Among other things, parties were requested "to come prepared to
define the precise issues, factual and legal, to be heard[.J" Appendix, page 34.
Beehive did not appear through counsel during the pretrial and trial phases of
this proceeding. Beehive's usual counsel, Mr. David Irvine, was engaged throughout
the late summer and entire fall of 1996 as campaign manager for a political candidate
in the first district congressional race. Beehive was represented throughout the
pretrial and trial of this matter through a lay person, its chief executive officer, Mr.
Art Brothers.
On September 4, 1996, the ALJ entered another order for the Commission,
12

requiring the Division and Beehive to submit a joint statement of trial issues and a
discovery schedule in light of those issues. Appendix, pages 35-36. This order also
noted the entry of another order by the Commission, providing for the protection of
Beehive data that might be deemed confidential or proprietary in nature. This
protective order notes that the contest between the Division and Beehive was to be
treated as an "arbitration." Appendix, page 38. Because of the significance of this
protective order to later stages of this contest between the Division and Beehive, it is
reproduced entirely in the Appendix at pages 37-46.
On September 11,1996, the Division submitted a statement of issues, pursuant
to the September 4th order referenced above, noting areas of agreement and
disagreement respecting what would be triable before the ALJ. Although the
Division's statement of issues is detailed, there is no indication that the proceeding
involved either an arbitration or an adjudication of willful violation by Beehive of
any state law or Commission rule or that fines, penalties, or other forms of sanction
would be at issue at the trial. Appendix, pages 47-48. On September 30, 1996,
Beehive filed a supplemental statement in this regard, mainly echoing the areas of
disagreement outlined in the Division's pleading. Beehive's supplement likewise
gives no inkling that willful misconduct, fines, penalties, or sanctions are at issue in
the proceeding. Appendix, pages 49-51.

Meanwhile, on September 26, 1996,
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AT&T determined to become involved in this proceeding. The Division's original
petition had identified the blocking of toll calls and the inability to dial 800 numbers
as quality of service issues. Appendix, page 2. These problems may have stemmed
from too few circuits to handle this traffic. A dispute existed between long distance
carriers and wireless carriers such as AT&T and local exchange carriers such as
Beehive concerning responsibility to provide additional circuits in this regard.
Underscoring this stalemate, a customer, Randy Faber, filed a complaint with the
Division against AT&T and Beehive respecting the sufficiency of circuits available to
handle in-coming long distance traffic to his local business. The Faber complaint, in
essence, notes that AT&T and Beehive appear to have a dispute over responsibility in
supplying these circuits, and that telephone customers should not be caught in the
middle. Appendix, page 52. AT&T accordingly filed a petition to intervene in the
Division/Beehive quality of service docket. Appendix, pages 53-55. Beehive
conditionally assented to this intervention. Appendix, page 56.
On October 7, 1996, the ALJ held a status conference in the proceeding. The
transcript of this hearing may be found at the Appendix, pages 57-71. At this
conference, the issues were sifted and refined to 6 and, according to the ALJ,"...
[A]t this point, I think we?re going to limit the proceeding to those six issues." None
of the 6 included any question respecting fines, penalties, or sanctions against
14

Beehive. Appendix, pages 64-65. The primary issue, in the eyes of the ALJ, was the
tariff issue; this was viewed essentially as a legal question that would require
extensive briefing, presumably because of difficulty and debatability. Appendix,
page 65. Discovery cutoff was fixed at November 1, 1996. Appendix, page 68.
Hence, from the time the Division had identified the issues to be tried, September
11th, or from the time the ALJ had limited those issues, October 7th, the parties were
given at most 2 months and at worst 24 days to conduct discovery in the case.
On October 9, 1996, the outcome of this conference was memorialized in an
order (styled "Ruling and Notice") that granted the petition of AT&T to intervene,
and identified with specificity and "limited" the issues to be resolved in the
proceeding. Appendix, pages 72-74. Consistent with prior pleadings and orders in
the case, this "Ruling and Order" nowhere raised any question respecting
contumacious behaviour by Beehive or fines, penalties, or sanctions for any such
behaviour. Appendix, pages 72-74. The "limited" language is found at Appendix,
page 72.
Promptly after the AT&T intervention was allowed by the ALJ on October 7th,
Beehive served AT&T with data requests on October 9th. Appendix, pages 87-88.
These requests sought information from the wireless division of AT&T that would
have been relevant to the tariff debate raised by the Division. Appendix, page 88.
15

AT&T, however, refused to answer these requests for information. On November 1,
1996, Beehive moved to compel, emphasizing the link between AT&T wireless and
the tariff question, and at the same time requesting postponement of the trial, then set
for mid-November, absent production of the information sought from AT&T and vital
to Beehive's defense in the case. Appendix, pages 89-90. Rather than produce the
information requested by Beehive, on November 1,1996, AT&T moved to withdraw
from the case. Appendix, pages 91-93. As noted below, this motion for withdrawal
was granted.
On November 1, 1996, the Division filed a pre-hearing position statement in
this proceeding. Appendix, pages 75-86. This pleading addresses only the tariff
dispute referenced above, but is important for a variety of reasons.
Like all of the pretrial pleadings and orders in this proceeding, it nowhere
suggests that either willful disobedience of Commission protocols or fines, penalties,
or sanctions for any such disobedience are at issue.
Indeed, the Division's pre-hearing position statement describes the tariff
dispute in terms that belie any argument for wilful disobedience. According to the
Division, during an era when wireless telecommunications carriers were regulated by
the UPSC, the relationship between wireline companies, like Beehive, and wireless
providers (such as AT&T Wireless, Appendix, page 76) that interconnect with
16

wireline networks had been resolved through negotiated so-called joint provisioning
agreements that, in turn, were subject to Commission approval. The nature, scope,
terms, conditions, and approvals for such agreements had been the subject of "months
of negotiations and hearings" in a separate UPSC docket prior to 1991. Appendix,
page 77. Indeed, "The charges that [wireless] customers would pay for joint network
use was highly controversial during the negotiations." Appendix, page 78.
In this regard, Beehive's concerns were that (a) it had not been a party to the
pre-1991 docket, and, therefore, should not be bound by whatever "precedent" may
have been set in this docket, (b) it had no negotiated, Commission approved
agreement with wireless carriers that would compensate Beehive for use by these
wireless carriers of the Beehive network, and, indeed, had been refused such
agreements by cellular carriers, and (c), in any event, a wireline call to a cell phone
might well be a toll call even though the wireline customer called a cellular prefix
within EAS because, as the Division acknowledged in its position statement, "In
reality, the cellular customers almost always have a larger geographic local calling
area than the wireline customers because of the transmitter/receiver area of coverage."
In other words, EAS calls from land lines to cell phones in this instance might be a
means of bootstrapping or "bridging" from the local calling area to a toll area, in
effect, obtaining long distance service at local rates. This practice of "bridging,"
17

which the Commission has disapproved on other occasions, in itself might be
considered discriminatory, unjust, or unreasonable within the meaning of the public
utilities code. Appendix, pages 164-167.
On November 12,1996, the hearing on the order to show cause was held before
the ALJ. Relevant excerpts from the hearing transcript, marshalling evidence
relevant to the tariff dispute in particular, are found in the Appendix at pages 94-168.
Tariff-related testimony is found in the Appendix at pages 102-105, 107, 109-110,
112-116, 118-120, 125, 129-135, 146-150, and 164-167.
Very little if any admissible testimony was presented by the Divison respecting
tariff violations, and this evidence, viewed in the context of other data from the
regulators, was inconclusive at best. All testimony was hearsay, since no billings
were introduced into evidence. Other than the double hearsay reference in the Sager
complaint, noted above, there was no evidence respecting the timing of
commencement of alleged tariff violations. There was no evidence at all concerning
the dates, time of day, duration, or number of violations. Indeed, some testimony
suggested that there were no tariff violations in the sense of billing and collecting
more than the tariff allowed because something was blocking the ability of
subscribers to dial the cellular prefixes, requiring customers to place the calls as toll
calls. Most important, as noted above, the Beehive tariff allows for the assessment of
18

toll charges when EAS circuits are used to capacity, during so-called "overflow"
periods. The Division, on the record, admitted this exception to the EAS rule, and the
Division submitted substantial evidence at the hearing to show that there were many
hours of each day that the Beehive system was in an "overflow" mode. Appendix,
pages 125 and 129-135. In light of the absence of specific evidence of the alleged
time of tariff violations, taken together with the substantial evidence of continual
overflow on the Beehive network, whether or not Beehive had committed a tariff
violation in any given instance was impossible to determine from the record at hand.
On the quality of service front, there was evidence that Beehive's lines had
static and other transmission problems. Moreover the speed with which service
problems were addressed was cause for concern in some instances. The Division
acknowledged, however, that the standards for reform in this regard, such as
installation of new lines, upgrading of switching equipment, reporting procedures,
and the like, were being newly minted by Division staff, and, in some instances, even
as late as the hearing date, had not been discussed with Beehive's management.
Appendix, pages 135-145 and 168.
The Division presented no evidence on the question of what is "just and
reasonable" in relation to either the tariff charges or the quality of service — as
required under Section 54-3-1 which provides, as quoted above in footnote 2, that
19

'The scope of definition 'just and reasonable' may include, but shall not be limited to,
the cost of providing service to each category of customer, economic impact of
charges on each category of customer, and on the well-being of the state of Utah;
methods of reducing wide periodic variations in demand of such products,
commodities or services, and means of encouraging conservation of resources and
energy." In this regard, the Division presumably was relying upon the pre-1991
docket and whatever findings may have been made therein as the evidentiary
foundation for attacking Beehive's approach to the wireline/cellular joint provisioning
issue.
The issue of fines and penalties was raised at the hearing for the first time - but
only as a possible, future enforcement tool. A Division witness, Peggy Egbert,
suggested that it might be appropriate to provide for the possibility of fines in the
order the Division was seeking from the Commission in the event Beehive did not
keep the new quality standards the Division expected to be imposed as a result of the
hearing. Appendix, pages 122-127.
At the conclusion of the Division's case in chief, Beehive orally moved the ALJ
for a continuance of the hearing, in order to allow Beehive further opportunity to
prepare and respond to the position of the regulators. Appendix, pages 154-160.
Among other grounds, Beehive indicated that, on the primary issue of tariff violation,
20

it had asked for specific data from the Division concerning contracts with US West,
AT&T and others, as well as the number and nature of alleged offenses and the like,
and that this information had not been supplied on discovery, and that, indeed, AT&T
had been allowed to withdraw from the case on the eve of the hearing. Beehive also
noted its confusion respecting what standards or rules it was expected to satisfy on
the quality of service front as part of the order to show cause. Beehive further noted
the threat of "monetary forfeitures," raised for the first time that day, as cause for the
continuance. Appendix, page 157. In response to the motion to continue, the
Division did not contend that Beehive had notice of the issue of fines. Nor did the
Division maintain that there was notice respecting the definition of standards to be
met. The Division simply argued that Beehive had been notified respecting the
nature of the complaints from customers, the identity of those customers, and the like,
and therefore should be prepared to go forward and defend.

The motion for

continuance was denied on the record by the ALJ.
On December 3, 1996, after the hearing on the order to show cause had been
concluded, Beehive made a written motion for additional time in which to defend.
Appendix, pages 169-170. This motion also was denied by the ALJ. Appendix,
pages 171-174.

21

After post-trial briefing, 3 on April 10,1997, the ALJ/Commission entered its
"Report and Order" in this case. This is the April 10th Order.

This Order is

reproduced in the Appendix at pages 180-196. The Commission ruled that the
conduct of Beehive mounted to a violation of Utah Code Annotated, sections 54-3-1
and 54-3-7, and was sanctionable under Utah Code Annotated, section 54-7-5(2).4
Indeed, the Report and order holds, as a matter of law, that "Each day of imposition
of a charge not sanctioned by [Beehive's] tariff is a separate violation of [section] 543-7, and is subject to the imposition of sanctions under [section] 54-7-5(2), UCA
1953, as amended." Appendix, page 191. Thus, the Commission not only required
Beehive to refund to subscribers all overcharges with interest, Appendix, page 192,
but also fined Beehive $182,500 for the tariff violations — "$500 for each day
[Beehive] has been imposing illegal charges." Appendix, page 194.

3 Even during post-trial briefing, the Division did not argue that Beehive had engaged
in willful misconduct or that it should be fined, penalized, or sanctioned by the
Commission. The Division instead argued that, in the event tariff overcharges were
found, Beehive should be required to cease and desist from this practice and to refund
all such overcharges, with interest, to subscribers. Appendix, page 178.
4 This statute provides, in pertinent part, that: "(1) Any public utility that violates or
fails to comply with this title or any rule or order issued under this title, in a case in
which a penalty is not otherwise provided for that public utility, is subject to a penalty
of not less than $500 nor more than $2,000 for each offense. (2) Any violation of this
title or any rule or order of the commission by any corporation or person is a separate
and distinct offense. In the case of a continuing violation, each dayfs continuance of
22

The April 10 Order was the first mention in any charging document that
Beehive was accused of violating section 54-3-7. Moreover, as shown from the
elaboration of the procedural background given above, this was the first time in the
proceeding that willful misconduct, fines, penalties, and sanctions were broached.
Beehive moved for reconsideration of the April 10th Order. This motion was
denied by the Commission. An appeal was taken to this Court. That appeal, by
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court, was held in abeyance in light of the
evolution of proceedings, described below, between the Division and Beehive at the
UPSC.
2. Enforcement of the $182,500 Fine
After entry of the April 10th Order, time passed. Beehive installed a new
switch and otherwise took steps to improve service in the Rush Valley service area.
Indeed, Beehive bent its oars on all fronts, with all personnel, to adhere, point by
point, to each and every service-related directive of the Commission.
The April 10th Order also directed the Division to perform certain tasks. The
Division was required, within 60 days of April 10th, to survey Beehive's customers to
ensure compliance with the billing mandates of the April 10th Order. Appendix, page
192. The Division also was required, within 120 days of April 10th, to survey
the violation shall be a separate and distinct offense."
23

Beehive's customers "to ascertain the level at that time of customer satisfaction with
[Beehive's] service." Appendix, pages 193-194. At subsequent hearings in this
matter, the lead witness for the Division, Peggy Egbert, admitted that neither of these
requirements was fulfilled as mandated. Appendix, pages 202-208.
Over one year passed, and the statute of limitations for enforcement of fines
and penalties imposed by the Commission, found at Utah Code Annotated, section
54-7-20(2), expired.
At this juncture, the Utah Attorney General's Office, acting as counsel for the
Division, served a data request upon Beehive. Contrary to the rules of professional
responsibility governing lawyers, this data request was not served upon counsel for
Beehive. An auditor for the Division went to Beehive headquarters and found
information suggesting that Beehive might still be charging toll rates on wireline calls
to cellular phones in the Rush Valley/Tooele service area. Approximately $5,000 in
questionable charges were involved.
This information was presented to the Division which in turn confronted
Beehive. Beehive indicated that, insofar as any tariff offense or violation of the April
10th Order might be involved, this would have been a mistake, and offered to refund
overcharges to relevant customers. As a precautionary step, Beehive in fact made this
refund (with interest) promptly, even absent a showing that the charges in question
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were illegal.
Notwithstanding these circumstances, on October 13,1998, the Division filed
another complaint with the Commission, alleging that Beehive had violated the April
10th Order, and seeking enforcement of the fines, penalties, and sanctions theretofore
imposed in the amount of $182,500. Appendix, pages 197-199.
Although the Division's complaint charged only a violation of the tariff ruling
in the April 10th Order, at the hearing on the complaint, commenced on short notice
(within 3 months of the complaint and allowing only one month for discovery), the
Division widened the scope of the inquiry to include all aspects of the Order. This
was allowed by the ALJ over the objections of Beehive.
Beehive defended on various grounds, procedural and substantive. As noted
above, it demonstrated compliance with all service related and billing related
requirements of the April 10th Order. On the question of tariff violations, Beehive
argued that the statute of limitations for enforcement of the fines had expired, that the
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try a contempt of its own order, that
imposition of a fine in the amount of $ 182,500 was excessive in view of the $5,000 in
alleged overcharges and especially in view of the good faith effort that Beehive had
made in terms of overall compliance with the April 10th Order, a compliance that was
proved conclusively at the hearing in question. Beehive also questioned whether the
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auditor's information was admissible at trial, whether it proved a violation of the tariff
or the April 10th Order, and, in any case, whether it was much mooted in view of the
pre-trial refund of all questionable charges by Beehive to customers.
After four days of hearings, ending March 24, 1999, and post-trial briefing,
concluded June 16,1999, the ALJ took these issues under advisement. On November
3,1999, the ALJ/Commission issued a "Report and Order." This is the November 3rd
Order. It is reproduced in the Appendix at pages 242-247. The November 3rd Order
held that the Division had failed to prove service/billing violations sufficient to
justify enforcement of penalties against Beehive, but that the $5,000 in tariff
overcharges required imposition of the $182,500 fine.
Beehive moved for reconsideration of the November 3rd Order and this motion,
under the applicable statutes and rules, was deemed denied. Beehive accordingly
appealed from the November 3rd Order to this Court. After this appeal was taken, the
Commission in fact agreed to reconsider the November 3rd Order, taking the matter
under advisement for an extended time period. After due deliberation, on February
5, 2002, the Commission granted reconsideration, reducing the fine, but otherwise
affirming the November 3rd Order. This ruling may be found in the Appendix at
pages 248-250. Beehive appealed the February ruling to this Court.
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VIII. SUMMARY OF LEGAL ARGUMENT
Beehive contends that the fine imposed under the April 10th Order is void as
violative of due process of law. There was no notice that fines would be at issue in
this proceeding. In concluding, as a matter of law, that Beehive was guilty of a tariff
violation, the Commission held that Beehive was bound by a docket to which it never
was a party. In concluding, as a matter of fact, that Beehive had violated the tariff,
the Commission relied entirely upon hearsay evidence, contrary to its own rules of
procedure, as well as due process. The admixture of functions, legislative, executive,
and judicial, between the Commission and the Division also offended due process.
Beehive also maintains that the April 10th Order should be reversed because,
contrary to the report of the Commission, 365 days of tariff violations were not
demonstrated (365 days x $500 per day = $182,500). Indeed, not a single day of
violations was demonstrated. And nothing at all was shown by the "clear and
convincing" evidence required, under Utah law, to prove a violation and impose a
fine under the relevant statute. The Commission merely assumed in the abstract that
violations occurred. Basing fines upon assumptions in the abstract far exceeds the
jurisdiction and power of the Commission under the relevant statute.
Beehive contends that the November 3rd Order (as well as the reconsidered
order) is void because it is predicated upon the April 10th Order which, as argued
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above, is void.
Moreover, The November 3rd Order should be reversed because the
enforcement action to obtain that Order was commenced after the applicable statute
of limitations had expired.
In addition, the November 3rd Order should be reversed because the
Commission lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a penalty that it previously
had imposed.
Furthermore, the November 3rd Order should be reversed on constitutional,
especially due process, grounds.
Finally, the November 3rd Order should be reversed because a violation of the
April 10th Order was not proved and hence there was no basis for enforcing the
$182,500 fine.
A. The Imposition of Fines and Penalties
In the April 10th Order Violated Due Process
The Commission violated the due process rights of Beehive in 4 different
particulars. Beehive believes that, for the most part, the Commission violations of
due process are obvious and do not require supporting citations. Nevertheless, as
general support for Beehive's analysis of these particulars, given below, Beehive
refers the Court to the extensive literature treating fines by administrative agencies,
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and the constitutional protections, including therightsto notice and juries, that should
be guaranteed to regulated entities such as Beehive. See generally, Charney, "The
Need for Constitutional Protections for Defendants in Civil Penalty Cases," 59
CORNELL L. REV. 478 (1974); Cheh, "Constitutional Limits on Using Civil
Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the
Criminal-Civil Law Distinction," 42 THE HASTINGS L. J. 1325 (1991); Clark,
"Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
Analysis," 60 MINN. L. REV. 379 (1976); Gellhorn, "Administrative Prescription
and Imposition of Penalties," 1970 WASH. U. L. Q. 265; Murphy, "Money Penalties
-- An Administrative Sword of Damocles," 2 SANTA CLARA LAW. 113 (1962);
Nelson, "Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties," 4 THE WESTERN
POL. Q. 610 (1951); and Thomforde, Jr., "Controlling Administrative Sanctions," 74
MICH. L. REV. 709(1976).
1. No Notice. Parties to judicial or administrative proceedings in this state are
vouchsafed procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as well as under the Utah Constitution. Due process means fair
procedure. The keystone of fair procedure is adequate notice. In administrative
proceedings wherefinesor penalties are to be imposed, parties should be given notice
that this contingency may materialize. While parties often debate how much notice is
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fair notice, no one would argue that a complete paucity of notice is fair notice. See,
e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Bagwell, 512 U. S. 821, 832 (1994);
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U. S. 506 (1974); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U. S. 488
(1974); Harris v. United States, 382 U. S. 162,167 (1965); zndln re Oliver, 337 U.
S. 257,273 (1948). See also, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 579 (1975) and Mullane
v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). Moreover, no one would
contend that a party may be penalized for violating an order, rule, or standard that had
not yet come into existence, or did not exist with sufficient clarity to be understood or
followed. See, e.g., Trinity Broadcasting of Florida v. FCC, 211 F.3d618 (D. C. Cir.
2000); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D. C. Cir. 1998);
General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-1329 (D. C. Cir. 1995); Satellite
Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D. C. Cir. 1987). Cf Yates v. United States,
316 F.2d 718, 723 (10th Cir. 1963); Denver-Greeley Valley Water Users Association
v. McNeil, 131 F.2d 67, 69 (10th Cir. 1942).
The record in this case is clear: from commencement of the action via the
order to show cause in July, 1996, through issuance of the April 10th Order, Beehive
received no notice that fines or penalties were at issue. Had Beehive been apprised of
the possibility of a fine in the amount of $182,500, it surely would have taken a
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different approach to the proceeding. It would have obtained counsel.5 It would
have asked for more than one month in which to conduct discovery. It would have
insisted upon the completion of discovery from the Division prior to the hearing
November 12, so that cross-examination of Division witnesses could have been more
effective. Indeed, as noted above, it would have obtained the data necessary to
ascertain what, if any, calls were made, when they were made, and whether they were
made at times of overflow or over-taxation of EAS circuits within the meaning of the
exception language under the Beehive tariff— all with a view to refuting the abstract
assumption of tariff violations later posing as a finding in the April 10th Order. It
would have prepared and presented a case on the issue of willfulness, since this is an
element of any claim for fines or penalties under the statute. It would have required

5 Even when fines were not an issue in the case, during pretrial proceedings, the
Division itself questioned whether Beehive should be represented by its CEO, Art
Brothers, rather than counsel. Appendix, page 61. But see Appendix, page 156 and
pages 164-167. A UPSC rule reportedly allows utilities to act through officers
without counsel when appearing before the Commission. Appendix, page 61.
Whatever the provenance of this rule, it may not pass muster under Utah law. See,
e.g., Tracy-Burke Associates v. Department of Employment Security, 699 P.2d 687
(Utah 1985); Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, 350 P.2d 616 (Utah 1960);
and Nelson v. Smith, 154 P.2d 634 (Utah 1944). And similar rules have been
challenged in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Idaho State Bar Assfn v. Idaho Public
Util. Com'n, 637 P.2d 1168 (Idaho 1981) and Denver Bar Association v. Public
Utilities Commission, 391 P.2d 466 (Colo. 1964) {en banc). Beehive's only concern
at this juncture, however, is with the due process implications of the Division and
ALJ and Commission allowing Beehive to act without counsel if they knew, at the
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greater formality in the proceeding and precision in the presentation of evidence and
the findings of the Commission.

It may have argued entitlement to certain

constitutional protections that arguably are available to respondents in contempt-type
proceedings.
What is more, it is clear from the testimony of the Division witnesses, Ms.
Egbert and Mr. Fuller, supplied in Beehive's Appendix, that the service regulations
(insofar as they were used as justification for the imposition of the fine) were newly
minted. Indeed, Ms. Egbert testified that some of these were "in the works," even as
the hearing was being conducted. The April 10th Order confirms this fact by calling
the reporting compliance procedures "Draconian." Surely Beehive may not be fined
for violating regulations that are "in the works" at the very hearing being conducted
to consider the propriety of creating such rules and whether to make them applicable
to Beehive.
The Commission and Division may argue that, since the $182,500 fine was
imposed but suspended, the due process rights of Beehive were not injured. It is
doubtful whether actual injury must be shown in order to obtain reversal of the order
in this respect, but in any event the injury, even from a suspended fine, is apparent.
This amount, $ 182,500, even as a contingent liability, may have a material impact on

time, without disclosing the same to Beehive, that a $182,500 fine was in the offing.
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the balance sheet of a small company such as Beehive, and, as such, may affect the
ability of Beehive to borrow or otherwise operate as a business. This seems
especially true if the shelf life of such a fine is more than one year. As shown below,
the Commission and Division take the position in this case that the duration of such a
fine, even if suspended, may be indefinite. Moreover, the power that such a fine,
especially one of undetermined duration, gives to the regulators over a utility may be
considerable. There is always the threat, implicit in the suspended fine, that, unless
the utility is willing to go along with the regulator's requests, in all areas of
administration, an excuse may be found to trigger enforcement of the suspended
penalty. Regulation, in the final analysis, is about power, and the suspended fine, in
this respect, may skewer and distort the relationship between Commission and utility.
2. No Separation of Functions. In performing their duties, administrative
agencies sometimes function in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity. When
these functions are combined in a single proceeding, however, abuse often results and
this may offend due process. This Court has warned that such a failure to separate
functions may result in a due process violation. See, e.g., In re Discliplinary Action
ofMcCune, 717 P.2d 701,706 (Utah 1986) ("[i]t would have been a clear violation of
state due process had bar counsel investigated, prosecuted and then participated as a
judge in the adjudication of this case[ ]"); Utah Department of Business Regulation,
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Division of Public Utilities v. Public Service Commission, 614P.2d 1242,1250-1254
(Utah 1980).
This combination of powers, with attendant abuse and violation of due process,
occurred in this proceeding. The Commission acted legislatively by imposing new
service standards, including what it described as "Draconian" reporting requirements.
The pricing docket for joint provisioning services between wireline and wireless
companies also represents the exercise of legislative power. See, e.g., Mountain
States Tel & Tel Co. v. Public Serv. Comfn, 155 P.2d 184, 187-188 (Utah 1945).
The Commission acted in an executive capacity when it ordered the Division to
police or investigate the customer complaints against Beehive, and when it directed
the ALJ to do likewise. The Commission put on its judicial hat when it made legal
rulings respecting the tariff violations and imposition of fines. Indeed, the assessment
of fines, like a citation for contempt, is a quintessential judicial function. The
Commission acted as executive when it sought to enforce the fine in the November
3rd Order that it had imposed judicially in the April 10th Order. During this entire
process, the Division, as an arm of the Commission, not only was serving as
policeman and enforcer, but also, as a matter of official Commission/Division policy
was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity as mediator of complaints between customers
and Beehive pursuant to formal Commission Rules. Appendix, pages 209-230.
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Beehive submits that it is inherently, fundamentally unfair to have the same agency
that makes the rules at the same time investigate, police, prosecute, and adjudge
violations and impose fines in relation to those rules.
Indeed, Beehive believes that the power to fine is, like the power to sentence, a
judicial function, and reposing this power in the Commission, standing alone, violates
separation of functions, separation of powers, and hence due process principles. See,
e.g., Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1, State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah
1998); Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994); Tite v. State Tax
Commission, 57 P.2d 734 (Utah 1936); Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992). Compare, Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 947 P.2d 664
(Utah 1997)(parole determinations are not an exercise of the power of sentencing
which is a judicial function). See also, Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720
(Minn. 1999). Cf. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950). See generally,
Utton, "Constitutional Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Functions by
Administrative Agencies," 7 NAT. RES. J. 599 (1967).
3. Bound by a Docket to Which It Was Not a Party. The Commission ruled
that the tariff issue presented primarily a question of law, and, adopting the argument
of the Division, concluded that Beehive was bound by the determinations, factual and
legal, in a prior docket involving the pricing of joint provisioning arrangements
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between wireline and wireless companies. There was no record evidence that
Beehive was a party to this prior docket. The Division made no request that the ALJ
take judicial notice respecting findings of fact from that docket. Since the 1991
docket was a pricing docket, the Commission probably was acting legislatively, not
judicially, and hence the principels of resjudicata or collateral estoppel, as applied to
agency rulings (a fairly complicated area in its own right), would not appear to
govern in any respect. But the invocation of these principles in this fashion in this
case against Beehive surely offends due process. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson
County,

U. S.

(1996) and Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32 (1940). Cf. 21 C.

Wright & K. Graham, Jr., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, section 5106
(Supp. 2001) and M/V Am. Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483,
1491 (9th Cir. 1983).
4. Imposing a Fine Based Upon No Evidence or Only Hearsay Evidence,
The Commission finding respecting tariff violations that led to imposition of the
$182,500 penalty, at best, was based entirely upon hearsay, a result expressly
forbidden by the Commission's own rules of procedure. See, e.g., Lake Shore Motor
Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959); Commission Rule
R746-100-10 F. 1. This may be ascertained from a review of the April 10th Order and
the footnoted citations to the hearing transcript. Appendix, pages 184-185. (These
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evidentiary matters are discussed in greater detail below.) For the most part, the
Commission merely assumed, without evidence or proof of any sort, that the tariff
violations were committed each and every day for an entire year, since this is how the
fine was calculated. Appendix, pages 191, 194, and 249 (365 days x $500 per day =
$ 182,500). Indeed, since the Division's complaint indicated that violations could not
have occurred prior to March, 1996, and since the hearing with evidentiary
submissions closed in November, 1996, it is plain that the Commission assumed
violations for the period from November, 1996, through March or April 1997, a
period of time when, by definition, no evidence of violations could have been
submitted or demonstrated. Beehive contends that it violates due process to base a
fine for $182,500 exclusively upon hearsay submissions, especially when the
agency's own rules forbid such a result. Beehive also contends that, where a
$ 182,500 penalty is concerned, it offends due process to base that penalty upon nonrecord assumptions.
B. The Fines and Penalties Imposed in the
April 10th Order Should Be Reversed
Because No Willful or Other Tariff Violations Were Shown
This Court has ruled that, whenever the UPSC imposes a fine for violation of
an ordinance of the utilities code, it may do so only upon proof of the violation that is
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"clear and convincing." Wycoff Company v. Public Service Commission, 369 P.2d
283 (Utah 1962). Although the Commission's procedural rules permit the receipt of
hearsay into evidence (but forbid the making of findings that are based exclusively
upon such hearsay), it is doubtful that hearsay evidence would satisfy the "clear and
convincing" standard. It is even more doubtful that a $182,500 fine, based upon
findings supported exclusively by hearsay, in contravention of the Commission's own
rules, would satisfy this clear and convincing standard.
The April 10th Order purported to "detail" the evidence supporting each of the
alleged tariff offenses committed by Beehive. Appendix, page 181. In connection
with the tariff offenses, the evidence relied upon by the Commission came from two
witnesses, Larry Fuller and Larry Russell. Appendix, pages 184-185. The Fuller
testimony cited in the Report and Order is an unsworn statement that describes the
manner in which cellular companies, not Beehive, charge customers in the Rush
Valley, Vernon, and Terra communities. Even if this testimony were relevant to the
question of Beehive's alleged overcharges, at the outset of the hearing, the ALJ had
noted on the record that unsworn statements could not be used to make findings.
Appendix, page 97. Russell's testimony was sworn, but confused. He thought he was
being charged wrongfully for cell calls to his landlinephone. Appendix, page 110.
Of course, Beehive has no relationship to these charges.
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Even assuming that Russell had testified that he had been charged wrongfully
for calls from his landline phone to a cell number within the local service area, this
would have been based upon a billing document that was not taken into evidence or
reviewed by the ALJ. Absent this billing document (an out of court statement), the
description of the bill by Russell would have been hearsay.
Putting questions of hearsay aside, however, there was no proof of any sort that
Beehive had overcharged customers under the tariff for every single day for an entire
year. Yet the Commission made this assumption in imposing the fine.
However faulty the Commission's analysis of the record at the hearing,
Beehive does not deny that there was some testimony at the hearing relating to some
aspect of the claim of tariff overcharges. As noted above, Beehive has marshalled all
of this testimony in its Appendix. But none of this testimony is other than hearsay.
Therefore, under the Commission rules, no finding is allowable based on any of it.
None gives us a date, time, or amount for overcharges. And dates and times were
essential to find a violation of the Beehive tariff, since that tariff, as all admitted,
permitted toll charges during overflow periods, that is, when the EAS circuits were
being used to capacity. In this regard, the regulatory evidence undercut any finding
of violation, since Peggy Egbert, the Division's lead witness, introduced a traffic
study of the Beehive circuits showing that they were indeed on overflow status much
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of the time. Appendix, pages 125 and 129-135. One cannot know whether the toll
calls were made within the overflow period, thus coming within the exception
language of the Beehive tariff, without pinpointing the time of these calls and crossreferencing those times to the overflow analysis in the Division's traffic studies.
Moreover, there was no testimony presented that addressed the element of
wilfullness, an element that must be proved in order to support the imposition of a
penalty or fine. Indeed, it is clear from the argument in the proceeding that the tariff
issue was treated as a legal issue, not one of fact wherein wilfullness or other
motivation would have been shown. And the question of law and regulatory policy
was described by the Division itself as controversial and therefore, presumably, one
upon which open minds reasonably could disagree.

This is not the stuff of

willfulness or contumacious conduct. In short, there was no evidence at all, certainly
no clear and convincing evidence, supporting the claimed violations and imposed
fines. This probably is why the Commission resorted to assumption, even assuming
violations for a time period, November, 1996, through April, 1997, after the trial and
outside the record. The fines imposed in the April 10th order clearly exceeded the
power of the Commission under section 57-7-25.

40

C. The Fines Enforced in the November 3rd Order Must Fall
Because They Are Based Upon the Fines Imposed
In the Fallen April 10th Order
The November 3rd Order enforced the $ 182,500finearisingfromthe April 10th
Order. Since the fines imposed in the April 10th Order, as argued above, must be
reversed on the basis of due process and evidentiary concerns, there is no predicate
for thefinesenforced in the November 3rd Order and the enforcement offinesin that
order also must be reversed. Cf. Hyde Construction Company v. Koehring Company,
388 F.2d501, 511 (10th Cir. 1968); Dunn v. United States, 388 F.2d 501, 511 (10th
Cir. 1968). See generally, Dobbs, "Contempt of Court: A Survey," 56 CORNELL L.
REV. 183,216-218(1971).
D. The November 3rd Order's Enforcement of a Fine
Must Be Reversed Because the Commission
Lacked Jurisdiction to Enforce the Fine
And Because, In Any Case, the Enforcement Proceeding
Was Barred by the Statute of Limitations
Title 57 of the Utah Code mandates a specific procedure for the enforcement of
orders (and, in particular, orders involving penalties) by the Commission and against
utilities. This procedure dictates where an action for the recovery of penalties shall
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be commenced, who must bring it, and the deadlines for filing. The Division has
ignored these requirements with consequences that are fatal to the November 3d
Order.
The Division's complaint in the fall of 1998 sought to recover the penalty
amount ($ 182,500) conditionally mandated in the April 10th Order. The Commission
receives power to assess penalties in chapter 7 of title 54 of the Utah Code. In
particular, this statutory empowerment is found in Utah Code Annotated, section 547-25. The April 10th Order, in the amount of penalty assessed and the manner of
assessment, clearly is derived from the provisions of subparts (1) and (2) of section
54-7-25. Chapter 7 of title 54 likewise delineates the procedures for enforcing such
assessments and recovering such penalties. In this regard, section 54-7-18(1) states
that: 'The courts of this state shall consider, hear, and determine all actions and
proceedings under this chapter/' that is, chapter 7, which, as noted above, regulates
the recovery of penalties from utilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
While section 54-7-18(1) addresses the forum requirements for the recovery of
penalties from utilities, section 54-7-29 regulates the parties who may bring such
actions. Section 54-7-29 provides that: "Actions to recover penalties under this title
shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. In any such action all penalties
incurred up to the time of commencing the same may be sued for and recovered. All
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fines and penalties recovered by the state in any such action, together with the cost
thereof, shall be paid into the state treasury to the credit of the General Fund. Any
such action may be compromised or discontinued on application of the commission
upon such terms as the court shall approve and order." (Emphasis supplied.)
This statutory regime is plain enough: Actions respecting the recovery of
penalties, according to the language of section 54-7-29, shall be brought in the name
of the state of Utah. The last sentence of section 54-7-29 clearly implies that the
Commision shall be the petitioning party, since the Commission alone is empowered
to discontinue or compromise the action for recovery of penalties. Section 54-7-29
makes clear, moreover, that any action to recover penalties must be commenced in
court. This follows, not only because it is impractical if not inappropriate for the
Commission, as a regulatory body, to seek enforcement of its order before itself, as a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, but also because the text of section 54-7-29 empowers
the Commission to discontinue or compromise actions for recovering penalties only
"upon such terms as the court shall approve and order."
The reference to court approval in the last sentence of section 54-7-29,
furthermore, brings us full circle to the language of section 54-7-18(1), quoted above,
which requires that actions for the recovery of penalties under chapter 7 of title 54, as
well as all other actions involving that chapter of the utilities statute, shall be brought
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in state courts. Section 54-7-18(1) again echoes the requirements of section 54-7-29,
moreover, by providing that, in all proceedings where "the commission or the state of
Utah is a party" and in which "any question arises ... under or concerning any order
or decision of the commision[,]" the matter is to receive priority on the court's
calendar.
Finally, Utah Code Annotated, section 54-7-20(1) provides that complaints
against a utility on account of illegal charges or unreasonable service shall be brought
before the Commission, and that the Commission then is empowered to deal with
these complaints, and where appropriate, after due investigation and hearings, to enter
orders for reparation and the like. Subpart (2) of section 54-7-20 addresses questions
of noncompliance with Commission orders which are entered pursuant to subpart (1)
of section 54-7-20. For example, section 54-7-20(2) provides that, where an order for
reparation has been made by the Commission, and the utility fails to comply with this
order, "suit may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
same." Section 54-7-20(2) also requires that "all complaints for the enforcement of
any order of the commission shall be filed in court within one year from the date of
such order."

(Emphasis supplied.)

The language of section 54-7-20(2) thus

reinforces the statutory directives, noted above, in sections 54-7-18(1) and 54-7-29,
that actions to enforce orders which impose penalties are a matter for judicial
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oversight rather than administrative regulation. In addition, section 54-7-20(2)
prevents parties from seeking enforcement after the expiration of one year from the
date of the order.
The November 3rd Order must be reversed in light of the provisions of chapter
7 of title 54. The April 10th Order had to be enforced and the $182,500 penalty
recovered, if at all, in state court, and not before the Commission. This enforcement
action should have been brought in the name of the state and controlled by the
Commission, not the Division. On the facts in our case, such an action, in any event,
would be time-barred. While Beehive has not found any Utah cases which explicate
this statutory requirement, it is not difficult to discern the legislative rationale.
The power to regulate is an amalgamation of power which includes the
authority, not only to promulgate laws in a legislative capacity, but also to adjudicate
disputes, sometimes involving those same regulations, as a judicial or quasi-judicial
body. These powers often are conjoined with the power to investigate and prosecute
as well. As citizens, we rightly are suspicious of the powers of the state, and
especially when those powers are reposed in a single body, undiluted, unseparated,
without check or balance. The Utah legislature, in chapter 7 of title 54, wisely has
hedged the power of the Commission respecting penalty contempt actions. Where the
Commission once has entered an order which imposes penalties, it may exercise
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discretion to determine whether the prosecution of a proceeding for contempt is
warranted or wise, but it may not also act as investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury
of that contempt, all in one.

Parties faced with a petition for the recovery of a

penalty, previously imposed, are entitled to have this controversy resolved through
the neutral mediation of a judicial body, rather than by the administrative agency
which imposed the penalty in the first instance. Viewed in this light, chapter 7 of title
54 may be a legislative antidote, insofar as actions for the recovery of penalties are
concerned, to the perennial conundrum of separation of functions in administrative
law. The statute also may represent an effort to avoid certain pitfalls under the due
process requirements of federal constitutional law. Cf. Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S. A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471,
485-86 (1972).6

6 The statutory scheme in chapter 7 of title 54 nowhere provides that this separation
of functions and impartial mediation may be supplied through an administrative law
judge, as distinct from courts outside the administrative agency. For whatever
reasons, the legislature apparently did not believe that hearings before an ALJ would
guarantee independent judicial review to the degree desired in actions for the
enforcement of orders and recovery of penalties. The legislature may have believed
that, even where an ALJ decides a question regarding enforcement or recovery in the
first instance, under the review provisions of Commission regulations, the ultimate
arbiter of these issues still will be the Commission as a whole, and hence, in the final
analysis there is no real escape from the quandary over separation of functions. In
addition, the legislature may have resolved that, even if the ALJ is an answer to the
problem of separation of functions, the due process rights, rights to trial by jury, and
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The provisions regulating jurisdiction and standing in chapter 7 of title 54
likewise may be the product, not only of legislative caution in the face of otherwise
unbridled administrative power, but also a matter of restraint to forestall the
transgression of other constitutional boundaries. The Division complaint sought
recovery of $182,500, but made no statement respecting disposition of this amount,
once recovered. We are left to presume that the penalty would be paid to the benefit
of the Commission or the Division, as an aid to further regulatory efforts. Section 547-29, as quoted above, however, is particular in requiring the payment of fines "into
the state treasury to the credit of the General Fund." By requiring that actions for the
recovery of penalties be brought in the name of the state, and further, that penalties
recovered be paid into the general fund, section 54-7-29 vitiates any suspicion that
enforcement actions may arise from the temptation to use the power to fine and the
office to enforce penalties as a means to subsidize underfunded regulatory coffers.
Cf. Wardv.Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972). Compare, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure,
456 U. S. 188 (1982); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U. S. 238 (1980).

other constitutional rights vouchsafed to litigants and discussed below are best
preserved through a judicial rather than an administrative process. The legislature
accordingly dictated that only courts shall have jurisdiction in proceedings for the
enforcement of orders and recovery of penalties from public utilities.
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Finally, actions for the recovery of penalties, in essence, are actions in the
nature of contempt proceedings. There always has been a concern that proceedings in
contempt, reflecting the law of kings, as wielded by judges who are men, may too
often be prosecuted as a means for private revenge rather than the public good. It has
been said that "contemptuous conduct, though a public wrong, often strikes at the
most vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament." Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U. S. 194, 202 (1968). And "men who make their way to the bench sometimes
exhibit vanity, irascibility, narrowness, arrogance, and other weaknesses to which
human flesh is heir."

Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 12 (1952). The

combination of such men with a power which is at once "unbridled" and "liable to
abuse" may be unfortunate in the extreme. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S., at 202.
Public Service Commissions and Administrative Law Judges, as human beings,
receive no special dispensation from these passions, and are equally susceptible to
mistake private vindication for the exercise of judgment when faced with an alleged
affront to their orders in a case. Indeed, some have argued that judges who act in a
regulatory as well as a judicial capacity may be more prone to abuse power, and
therefore would withhold the contempt authority from them altogether.7

7 Justice Douglas, for example, once famously dissented from the promulgation of a
rule of procedure which would grant the contempt power to bankruptcy judges. He
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Since contempt proceedings (where fines are enforced rather than threatened
only for coercive effect) may be in the nature of criminal proceedings, they raise
concerns over constitutional rights such as the right to trial by jury, under either the
sixth or the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. See, ej*., Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194 (1968). The standards for determining when these
proceedings may be criminal, especially in the area of penalties under administrative
law, are not precise, and often are difficult of application. See, e.g., United States v.
Ward, 448 U. S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U. S. 144 (1963).
Even where the recover of penalties is civil in character, the right of trial by jury
would be available under state or federal constitutional measures.
In the face of these issues, it is not improbable that the Utah legislature opted
for constitutional safety rather than administrative efficiency in the passage of chapter
7 of title 54. Whether or not these constitutional questions were to the fore in the

remarked: "I once knew most of the referees in the Nation and worked with them on
various projects. But they, too, flourish under Parkinson's Law; and their power
grows like that of a prince in a medieval kingdom. That may not be ominous when it
relates only to administrative detail. But it is for me alarming to vest appointees of
bankruptcy courts with the power to punish for contempt... Walter Nelles long ago
reminded us that summary procedure of contempt is a 'legal thumbscrew/ the 'most
autocratic ofjudicial powers,' and i n practice the most indefinite' [citation omitted]
... Extension of the contempt power to administrative arms of the bankruptcy court is
not consistent with close confinement of the contempt powers." Bankruptcy Rules
and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 411 U. S. 991, 993, and 994 (1974) (J. Douglas,
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minds of the lawmakers, on balance, the legislature may have believed that judicial
oversight would be a worthwhile palliative to the risk of regulatory zeal, and that the
opportunity to request peer review through jury trial would add to this protection.
E. The Enforcement of the Fine in the November 3rd Order
Was a Criminal Contempt, And Therefore Must Be Reversed
Because Beehive Was Denied Constitutional Protections
As indicated in the authorities cited above, assuming the enforcement of the
fine were to be tolerated, this would be in the nature of a criminal contempt, and
Beehive would be entitled to the entire panoply of constitutional protections available
to defendants in this instance, especially the protection of trial by jury. Beehive did
not waive these rights before the agency; indeed, Beehive demanded them over and
over. Thus, even if the public utility code may be read to give the Commission
jurisdiction to enforce an order for fines, this jurisdiction must be exercised, if at all,
consistent with the jury trial and other constitutional rights available to defendants in
criminal contempt proceedings. Moreover, Beehive restates and incorporates all of
the separation of functions, separation of powers, and due process arguments made
above respecting the April 10th Order by this reference in relation to its challenge to
the November 3rd Order.

dissenting).
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F. The Enforcement of the Fine in the November 3 Order
Must Be Reversed Because There Was No Proof
Of a Contempt of the April 10th Order
The Division failed to prove there was a tariff overcharge in violation of the
April 10th Order, and hence there was no warrant for enforcing the fine in the
November 3rd Order.
The Division attempted to prove tariff overcharges through the testimony of
Krystal Fishlock, a staff auditor at the DPU. It is undisputed that Ms. Fishlock
identified the possibility of overcharges through Beehive records that were not
introduced into evidence at the hearing. Her testimony in this regard was hearsay.
No foundation was laid that would qualify Ms. Fishlock as an expert.8 Nor was there
any foundation showing that the records at Beehive upon which she based her
testimony would qualify under any exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, there
simply was no non-hearsay testimony (let alone clear and convincing evidence) upon

8 As noted above, the information that was used by Ms. Fishlock in her testimony
was obtained from Beehive when the Attorney General's Office, acting as counsel
for the Division, served Beehive, but not its counsel, with a data request. This
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct alone might warrant exclusion of
the proffered testimony. Putting these ethical concerns aside, however, it is clear
that the testimony was proffered in violation of the protective order earlier entered
by the Commission in this proceeding. Appendix, pages 37-46. This is an
additional reason for exclusion of the testimony.
51

which the Commission, under its own rules, could predicate a finding of violation of
the April 10th order.
What is more, Ms. Fishlock herself identified the provision of the Beehive
tariff that permits toll charges during overflow periods, when the EAS circuits are
being used to capacity. Her testimony in this regard was without foundation, based
on hearsay or assumption, and therefore incomplete and inconclusive.

It is

impossible to determine from her testimony whether the charges she had identified as
possible violations were made at a time when the EAS circuits were being overtaxed.
Moreover, no evidence of contumacious conduct was presented by the Division.
Finally, the pretrial voluntary refund of all possible overcharges, with interest, by
Beehive, surely mooted or purged the question of violation or contempt of any
Commission order.
IX. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
For all of the foregoing reasons, Beehive believes that the fines were entered in
violation of due process and other constitutional guarantees, and asks the Court to
reverse the orders of the Commission insofar as they assess, impose, or purport to
enforce any such fines in whatever amount.
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Dated this 20th day of September, 2002.

Alan L. Smith (Utah Bar No. 2988)
Attorney and Counselor at Law
31 L Street, No. 107
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
Telephone: (801)521-3321
Attorney for Petitioner
Beehive Telephone Company
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